The Commission on Capital Cases updates this information regularly. This information, however, is subject to change and may not reflect the latest status of an inmate’s case and should not be relied upon for statistical or legal purposes.
VALENTINE, Terance (B/M)
DC # 119682
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Case #88-12996
Sentencing Judge, Trial I: The Honorable M. William Graybill
Sentencing Judge, Trial II: The Honorable Diane Allen
Attorneys, Trial I: Thomas Meyers & Linda McKinley – Assistant Public Defenders
Attorneys, Trial II: Walter M. Lopez Jr., Esq. & Simson Unterberger, Esq.
Attorney, Direct Appeal I: Douglas S. Connor – Assistant Public Defender
Attorney, Direct Appeal II: Douglas S. Connor – Assistant Public Defender
Attorney, Collateral Appeals: Richard Kiley – CCRC-M
Date of Offense: 09/09/88
Date of Sentence I: 04/12/90
Date of Sentence II: 09/30/94
Circumstances of Offense:
Terance Valentine and his wife Livia Romero immigrated to the United States in 1975. The couple settled in New Orleans and adopted a child, Giovanna. After seeking a divorce from Valentine in 1986, Romero married Ferdinand Porche. Romero then relocated with her daughter and new husband to Tampa, Florida. Shortly after the move, Romero began receiving threatening phone calls from Valentine.
On 09/09/88, Ferdinand Porche returned home to meet his family. When Porche entered the house, Valentine shot him in the back, severing his spinal cord and rendering him paralyzed from the waist down. Valentine said to Porche, “This is my revenge.” Porche was forced to crawl into the bedroom where he saw his pregnant wife naked, bound and gagged, and his baby crying. Valentine then began to systematically beat and torture Porche, announcing, “I’m gonna kill you, but you’re gonna suffer.”
Valentine then transported Porche and Romero to a remote location and shot them both. Livia Romero survived the attack and informed police that Valentine was the assailant. In the weeks following her release from the hospital, Romero began to receive calls from Valentine. With the help of police recording devices, Romero taped her conversations with Valentine, which subsequently led to his arrest.
09/21/88 Defendant indicted on the following charges:
Count I: Armed Burglary
Count II: Kidnapping
Count III: Kidnapping
Count IV: Grand Theft 2nd Degree Motor Vehicle
Count V: First-Degree Murder
Count VI: Attempted First-Degree Murder
01/25/90 Judge Graybill declared a mistrial after the jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict as to Valentine’s guilt. A new trial was set for 03/26/90.
03/29/90 The new jury found the defendant guilty on all counts charged in the
03/30/90 Upon advisory sentencing, the jury, by a 10 to 2 majority, voted for the
04/12/90 The defendant was sentenced as follows:
Count I: Armed Burglary – 99 years
Count II: Kidnapping - 99 years
Count III: Kidnapping – 99 years
Count IV: Grand Theft 2nd Degree Motor Vehicle – 5 years
Count V: First-Degree Murder - Death
Count VI: Attempted First-Degree Murder – Life
04/15/93 The Florida Supreme Court reversed Valentine’s convictions and sentence
and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court’s failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into allegations that the State used its peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury during voir dire. The Florida Supreme Court found a Neil violation.
07/16/94 At retrial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts charged in the
07/19/94 Valentine waived the jury’s advisory sentence recommendation.
09/30/94 At retrial, the defendant was sentenced as follows:
Count I: Armed Burglary – Life
Count II: Kidnapping - Life
Count III: Kidnapping – Life
Count IV: Grand Theft 2nd Degree Motor Vehicle – 5 years
Count V: First-Degree Murder - Death
Count VI: Attempted First-Degree Murder – 30 years
Florida Supreme Court – Direct Appeal I
616 So. 2d 971
05/14/90 Appeal filed.
04/15/93 FSC reversed Valentine’s convictions and sentence and remanded for a
new trial due to the trial court’s failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into allegations that the State used its peremptory challenges to excluded African Americans from the jury in violation of State v. Neil.
05/17/93 Mandate issued
Florida Supreme Court – Direct Appeal II
688 So. 2d 313
10/07/94 Appeal filed.
12/19/96 FSC affirmed the convictions and sentence of death.
02/19/97 Rehearing denied.
03/20/97 Mandate issued.
United States Supreme Court - Petition for Writ of Certiorari
522 U.S. 830
05/16/97 Petition filed.
10/06/97 Petition denied.
State Circuit Court - 3.850 Motion
05/28/98 Motion filed.
05/14/01 Amended motion filed.
10/28/02 Motion granted in part for an evidentiary hearing and denied in part.
08/03/05 Second Amended motion filed.
10/16/06 Third Amended motion filed.
01/09/07 Amendment denied.
07/31/08 Fourth Amended motion filed.
07/06/10 Motion denied.
Florida Supreme Court – 3.850 Appeal
07/27/10 Appeal filed
Florida Supreme Court – Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
03/02/11 Petition filed
Factors Contributing to the Delay in the Imposition of the Sentence:
Valentine’s first Direct Appeal was pending from 05/14/90 – 04/15/93. The 3.850 Motion was pending from 05/28/98 to 07/06/10.
On 05/14/90, Valentine filed a Direct Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court. In that appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into the defense’s claim that the State used peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury in violation of State v. Neil. Neil set forth the guidelines for determining whether a peremptory challenge was unlawfully exercised on the basis of race. The Florida Supreme Court also examined Valentine’s claim according to the dictates of State v. Slappy. In Slappy, the Florida Supreme Court mandated that, unless the trial court can cite specific circumstances in the record to eliminate the all allegations of discrimination, then an inquiry must be conducted. Subsequent to Valentine’s conviction and prior to the disposition of his Direct Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this same issue in State v. Johans, in which the Florida Supreme Court dictated that, once a party made an objection to the use of peremptory challenges during voir dire and showed that the challenged individuals were from a specific race, then an inquiry must be conducted. Since Johans was not decided at the time of Valentine’s conviction, the Florida Supreme Court analyzed Valentine’s claim under the provisions of Neil and Slappy. As such, the Florida Supreme Court found error in the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into the defense’s allegation that the State used peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that several more of Valentine’s claims had merit. The court stated:
Although the above issue is dispositive of this case, we briefly evaluate several additional claims to assist the trial court in the event of retrial. In the context of this case, we find no merit to the following claims: The State failed to obtain the daughter's consent prior to recording the family's telephone calls; and Romero's testimony concerning the Bronco was inadmissible hearsay. The following claims have merit: The daughter's taped conversation was inflammatory and irrelevant; Romero's taped statement that Valentine was a drug dealer was irrelevant; the daughter's prior inconsistent statement should not have been admitted without a proper foundation; the sentencing order is flawed by the court's failure to conduct an independent weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and the jury was improperly instructed on the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atrocious or cruel per Espinosa v. Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed Valentine’s convictions and sentences and remanded for a new trial on 04/15/93.
Following retrial, Valentine was again convicted on all counts charged in the indictment and sentenced to death. He again filed a Direct Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court. In that appeal, Valentine argued that since he and Romero were never legally divorced, portions of her testimony should have been barred under the spousal evidentiary privilege. Valentine also claimed that he was illegally arrested on a flawed warrant and thus his statements to law enforcement were tainted by the illegal arrest. He also argued that the introduction of footprint evidence was error because it insufficiently linked to him to the crime. Additionally, Valentine argued that his conviction for Attempted First-Degree Murder was erroneous. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Valentine’s sentence of death on 12/19/96.
On 05/16/97, Valentine filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court that was denied on 10/16/97.
On 05/28/98, Valentine filed a 3.850 Motion in the State Circuit Court. Amended 3.850 Motions were filed on 5/14/01. The motion was granted in part on 08/01/02 for an evidentiary hearing and denied in part the same day. On 08/03/05, Valentine filed a second amended motion in the State Circuit Court. On 10/16/06, he filed a third amended motion and then on 01/09/07, an order was issued denying the amendment to the 3.850 motion. On 07/31/08, Valentine filed a fourth amended motion in the Circuit Court. This motion was denied on 07/06/10.
Valentine filed a 3.850 Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court on 07/27/10. This appeal is currently pending.
Valentine filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Florida Supreme Court on 03/02/11. This petition is currently pending.
DATE DAYS VIOLATION LOCATION
-------- ---- ---------------------------- -------------------
05/16/96 0 DISRESP.TO OFFICIALS UNION C.I.
12/11/97 10 DISRESP.TO OFFICIALS UNION C. I.
07/18/00 30 FIGHTING UNION C. I.
09/24/00 0 DEFACING STATE PROP. UNION C. I.
05/08/01 30 LOANING MONEY UNION C. I.
06/07/01 60 DISRESP.TO OFFICIALS UNION C. I.
10/10/01 60 DISORDERLY CONDUCT UNION C. I.
09/03/02 180 UNARMED ASSAULT UNION C. I.
12/26/02 60 DISRESP.TO OFFICIALS UNION C. I.
02/24/05 60 DISRESP.TO OFFICIALS UNION C. I.
Report Date: 07/10/02 EW
Approved: 07/11/02 WS
Updated: 03/08/11 EMJ
 State v. Neil – case law that sets forth the protocol for determining whether a peremptory challenge was unlawfully exercised on the basis of race.