The Commission on Capital Cases updates thisinformation regularly.  This information, however, is subject to changeand may not reflect the latest status of an inmate’s case and should not berelied on for statistical or legal purposes.

WINDOM, Curtis (B/M)

DC #   368527

DOB: 01/29/66

Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County, Case #92-1305

Sentencing Judge: The Honorable Dorothy J. Russell

Attorneys, Trial: Ed Leinster, Esq. - Private

Attorney, Direct Appeal: Christopher S. Quarles - AssistantPublic Defender

Attorney, Collateral Appeals: Harry Brody – Registry

Date of Offense: 02/07/92

Date of Sentence: 11/10/92

Circumstances of the Offense:

On the morning of 02/07/92, Curtis Windom learned thatJohnnie Lee, an acquaintance who owed him nearly $2,000, had just wonapproximately $100 at the dog track.  Windom assured Jack Luckett, the manwho had told him about Lee’s winnings, that he was going to kill Lee and thatLuckett would be sure to read about it.

That same day, Windom purchased a .38 caliber revolver fromWalmart, as verified by the sales receipt.  The clerk who sold him the guntestified that Windom was as “calm as could be.”  Following the purchase,Windom located Lee, who was talking to two women by the side of the road. Windom pulled up beside Lee and shot him twice in the back.  Windom thengot out of the car and shot Lee again at very close range. 

Windom then ran towards the apartment complex where hisgirlfriend, Valerie Davis, and her mother, Mary Lubin, lived.  Windom, whoshared a child with Davis, had lived with her intermittently.  CassandraHall, a friend of Davis’, had just arrived at the apartment and witnessedWindom shoot Davis once in the chest.  Hall noted that Davis was shot andkilled without provocation. 

As Windom fled the apartment, he encountered KennethWilliams, who he shot in the chest at a very close range.  Williamssurvived the shooting.  Williams noted that before Windom shot him, helooked abnormal and visibly disturbed.  Windom fled behind Brown’s Bar,where several men attempted to take the gun away from him.  By this time,Mary Lubin, the mother of victim Valerie Davis, had learned that her daughterhad been shot and was on her way home.  Windom saw Lubin stopped at a stopsign and approached her vehicle.  Windom said something to Lubin beforeshooting her twice and killing her.

Windom was convicted of three counts of First-Degree Murderand one count of Attempted First-Degree Murder.

Trial Summary:

03/03/92         The defendant was indicted on the following charges:

                                   Count I:          First-Degree Murder (Lee)

                                   Count II:         First-Degree Murder(Davis)

                                   Count III:        First-Degree Murder(Lubin)

                                   Count IV:        Attempted First-DegreeMurder (Williams)

08/28/92         The jury found the defendant guilty of all counts charged in the

indictment.

09/23/92         Upon advisory sentencing, the jury, by a 12 to 0 majority, voted for the

imposition of thedeath penalty for all three murder convictions.

11/10/92         The defendant was sentenced as followed:

                                   Count I:          First-Degree Murder - Death

                                   Count II:         First-Degree Murder -Death

                                   Count III:        First-Degree Murder -Death

CountIV:        Attempted First-DegreeMurder  – 22 Years

Appeal Summary

Florida Supreme Court - Direct Appeal

FSC#80,830              

656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995)

11/30/92         Appeal filed.

04/27/95         FSC affirmed the convictions and sentences of death.

06/29/95         Rehearing denied.

08/01/95         Mandate issued.

United States Supreme Court - Petition for Writ ofCertiorari

USSC# 95-6232

516 U.S. 1012 (U.S. 1995)

10/02/95         Petition filed.

12/04/95         Petition denied.

State Circuit Court - 3.850 Motion

CC #92-1305

03/20/97         Motion filed.

11/01/01         Motion denied.

Florida Supreme Court - 3.850 Appeal

FSC# 01-2706

886 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2004)

12/06/01         Appeal filed.

05/06/04         Denial affirmed.

07/08/04         Rehearing denied.

Florida Supreme Court - Petition for Writ of HabeasCorpus

FSC# 02-2142

886 So.2d 915 (Fla. 2004)

10/02/02         Petition filed.

05/06/04         Petition denied.

07/08/04         Rehearing denied.

United States District Court, Middle District –Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

USDC #04-cv-01378

09/15/04         Petition filed.

11/02/07         Petition denied.

State Circuit Court - 3.851 Motion

CC #92-1305

08/21/07         Motion filed.

01/09/08         Motion denied.

United States Court of Appeal, 11th Circuit – HabeasPetition Appeal

USCA# 07-15876

578 F.3d 1227

05/12/08         Appeal filed.  

08/10/09         Affirmed USDC denial

United States Supreme Court – Petition for Writ ofCertiorari

USSC# 09-8930

130 S.Ct. 2367

11/09/09          Petition filed.

05/05/10          Petition denied.

Factors Contributing to Delay in the Imposition of theSentence:

Windom’s 3.850 Motion was pending in the State Circuit Courtfor over 4 ½ years, until finally being denied on 11/01/01.

Case Information:

On 11/30/92, Windom filed a Direct Appeal in the FloridaSupreme Court.  In that appeal, he argued that the prosecutor’s discriminatoryuse of peremptory challenges denied him the right to an impartial jury and, inturn, a fair trial.  After reviewing the record, the Florida Supreme Courtnoted:

The defendant relied on this peremptory strike in allegingthat it was reversible error for the trial court not to require the State tohave and express a race-neutral reason for the challenge.

Consistent with what we have held in Alen and Johans, and from our review ofthe voir dire record, we conclude, in respect to this prospective juror, thatthe defendant's expressed objection did not make it necessary for the trialcourt to require the State to have and express a race-neutral reason for thechallenge. We reiterate once again what we stated specifically in Neil: thereis an initial presumption that peremptories will be exercised in anondiscriminatory manner. A party concerned about the other side's use ofperemptory challenges must make a timely objection which demonstrates on therecord that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group andthat there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely becauseof their race. We followed this statement in Johans by requiring a Neil inquirywhen an objection is raised that a peremptory challenge is being used in aracially discriminatory manner. However, a timely objection and a demonstrationon the record that the challenged person is a member of a distinct racial grouphave consistently been held to be necessary.

In Johans, the objection was timely and the factual demonstrations made.Johans, 613 So. 2d at 1321. Moreover, we pointed out in Alen that because thequestion of one's membership in a cognizable class is a matter of fact, thetrial judge is granted discretion in making this determination when anobjection is made to a peremptory challenge. Alen, 616 So. 2d at 456.
 
Here, defense counsel did not make a timely objection in which it wasdemonstrated on the record that this venire person was a member of a cognizableclass. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by sustainingthe subject challenge, and thus reject defendant's first point on appeal.

Windom also argued the admission of victim impact testimonyby a police officer during the sentencing phase was error.  The FloridaSupreme Court agreed, noting “The testimony in which the police officertestified about the effect on children in the community other than the victim’stwo sons was erroneously admitted because it was not limited to the victim’suniqueness and the loss to the community’s members by the victim’sdeath.”  Even so, the Florida Supreme Court noted that Windom did notobject to the police officer’s testimony specifically and that his claim wasprocedurally barred.  Windom also claimed that the trial court erred inits consideration and application of the cold, calculated, and premeditated(CCP) aggravating factor.  The Florida Supreme Court noted that while themurder of Johnnie Lee could be deemed cold, calculated, and premeditated, themurders of Valerie Davis and Mary Lubin could not.  Windom, however, in aneffort to conceal his drug-trafficking history from being unveiled during thepenalty phase, elected not to have any mitigating circumstances presented onhis behalf.  As such, evidence in support of aggravating factors faroutweighed evidence in mitigation.  On 04/27/95, the Florida Supreme Courtaffirmed the convictions and sentences of death.

On 10/02/95, Windom filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorariin the United States Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied.

Windom next filed a 3.850 Motion in the State CircuitCourt.  That motion was denied on 11/01/01, after which Windom filed a3.850 Appeal in the Florida Supreme Court.  That appeal was affirmed05/06/04.

Windom also filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus inthe Florida Supreme Court which was denied 05/06/04.

On 09/15/04, Windom filed a Petition for Writ of HabeasCorpus in the United States District Court, Middle District.  Thispetition was denied and dismissed with prejudice on 11/02/07.

On 08/21/07, Windom filed a 3.851 Motion in the StateCircuit Court.  This motion was denied on 01/09/08.

On 05/12/08, Windom filed a Habeas Petition Appeal in theUnited States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit.  The lower court’s denial ofthe petition was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals on 08/10/09.

On 11/09/09, Windom filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorariin the United States Supreme Court, which is pending.

On 05/05/10, the United States Supreme Court denied Windom’sPetition for Writ of Certiorari.

Institutional Adjustment:

______________________________________________________________________

Reported         02/25/03          EW

Approved        02/27/03          WS

Updated          08/25/10          MJH